### SOP

#### Status quo power projection is structurally bankrupt– disconnect from political will, lack of congressional approval, and Presidential variance

**Gallagher, 2011**[Joseph, served as an F/A-18C Pilot, Air Officer, and F/A-18C/D Flight Instructor in the US Marine Corps operating forces, He worked Security Assistance initiatives for the US European Command and most recently as a Joint Planner in the USEUCOM J3 and J5, Gallagher is currently assigned to the Joint Staff, Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell; “Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication”, Parameters, summer, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011summer/gallagher.pdf)

Understanding the Gap Since World War II, a wide gap has developed between Congress

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wage fewer of them—and be far better positioned to win them.

#### Presidential discretion results in miscalc and war – Congressional deliberation must be revived

**Adler, 2011**[David, Director of the Andrus Center for Public Policy at Boise State University, where he holds an appointment as the Cecil Andrus Professor of Public Affairs; “Presidential Ascendancy in Foreign Affairs and the Subversion of the Constitution”, Presented to the German-American Conference on “Comparisons of Parliamentary and Coordinated Power (Presidential) Systems, March 4-8, 2011, Bloomington, Indiana; http://www.civiced.org/pdfs/GermanAmericanConf2011/Adler.pdf)

A considerable literature urges executive supremacy, and extols the supposed virtues of presidential assertion

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policy concerns are even more compelling today than they were two centuries ago.

#### Power projection is a controlling impact – the alternative risks global hotspot conflict escalation in every region of the world – a multipolar world would not solve global problems, but would only increase the likelihood of war.

**Kagan, 2007**[Robert, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History, 6-19, <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html>)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations

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a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

#### And, there’s strong statistical support

**Drezner, 2005**[Daniel, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Gregg Easterbrook, War, and the Dangers of Extrapolation”, May 25, http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html)

Via Oxblog's Patrick Belton, I see that Gregg Easterbrook has a cover story

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, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

#### Statutory restrictions solve the reliability dilemmas inherent to Presidential discretion

**Manzi, 13**[Jim, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and founder and chairman of Applied Predictive Technologies (APT), an applied artificial intelligence software company; “A Dissent on Syria”, The National Review, 2013, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/357680/dissent-syria-jim-manzi)

On Tuesday, this magazine again endorsed military action in Syria. I disagree.

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about their judgment in these matters. Apparently, you would be wrong.

#### Executive flexibility cannot be properly controlled – ensures entanglement – plan redistributes power and checks circumvention

**Brookings, 2013** (Brookings Institution, Summary of a discussion “The Road to War: Presidential Commitments and Congressional Responsibility”, Moderator: Martin Indyk, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at Brookings; Featured Speaker: Marvin Kalb, Guest Scholar in foreign Policy at Brookings, Discussant: Michael O’Hanlon, Director of Research in Foreign Policy at Brookings, June 20, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/06/20-war-presidential-power)

At a Brookings event on June 20, 2013, veteran political journalist and Brookings

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of the United States should converse with Congress before taking any military action.

### Credibility

#### Presidential hair-trigger diminishes America’s international position – refocusing war processes is critical

**Haass, 2013**[Richard, Council on Foreign Relations President, “Is the U.S. Overreaching Abroad?” PBS News Hour, Conversation with RichardHaass, Interviewer, Margaret Warner, May 28, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june13/haas_05-28.html>)

**MARGARET WARNER:** Now, let me ask you this. The last three presidents

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again, we will only be able to do it if we're strong.

#### Congressional approval ensures common purpose – signals credible foreign policy and affirms international coalition-building while preserving the military option

**Frye, 2002**[Alton, President Senior Fellow Emeritus, “Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism”, Council on Foreign Relations, April 17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514)

4. CONSENSUS IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL COHESION The case for active, continuing

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that Congress will play its proper constitutional role in the war on terrorism.

\*edited for gendered language

#### And, presidential discretion collapses our ability to sustain global alliances and multilateral institutions

**Schiffer and Currier, 2008**[Adam, an assistant professor of political science at Texas Christian University; Carrie Liu, an assistant professor of political science at Texas Christian University; “War Powers, International Alliances, the President, and Congress”, http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/public/repository/US\_Gov\_Balance\_of\_Power\_SF.pdf)

The president’s advantages over Congress in the foreign policy realm have consequences far beyond the

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and how they are used to establish the legitimacy of American foreign policy.

### Solvency

**Plan: The United States federal government should increase statutory restrictions on the War Powers Resolution by requiring congressional approval for preemptive use of Armed Forces into hostilities.**

#### Congress should approve each use of military force – it is quick, effective, and key to military effectiveness

**Frye, 2002**[Alton, President Senior Fellow Emeritus, “Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism”, Council on Foreign Relations, April 17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514)

Three decades’ experience under the War Powers Act has been mixed, but on balance

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, Congress may find it wise to separate policy verdict from pragmatic consequences.

#### Statutory restrictions are the ONLY effective mechanism

**Martin, 2011**[Craig, Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Baltimore Law School, “Taking War Seriously: A Model for Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Force in Compliance with International Law”, Brooklyn Law Review, Winter, 76 Brooklyn L. Rev. 611, Lexis)

Turning to the second element of the Model--the provision that would require legislative

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the form of unsound or dangerous decisions regarding the use of force. n271